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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JUDY GIBSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080296-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (2008). Appellant Judy Gibson was convicted and sentenced for unlawful
dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-513 (2003). The judgment of conviction is attached as Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether Gibson should have been allowed to withdraw the plea agreement where
the State failed to disclose information relevant to the terms and conditions, thereby
preventing Gibson from entering into a knowing and voluntary agreement.
Standard of Review: This Court will review issues relating to plea agreements
under an abuse of discretion standard. See_ State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ^f 7-8, 140
P.3d 1288. Also, it will review a trial court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard. See id at ^ 7 (citing State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 10, 983 P.2d 556). It
will review questions of law for correctness. IcL at ^j 8 (stating "[t]he correctness standard

for reviewing the lawfulness of the underlying plea operates in most instances to
neutralize the abuse of discretion standard for rulings on motions to withdraw pleas")
(citing State v Hittle, 2004 UT 46, \ 4, 94 P.3d 268); see also State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d
205, 208 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue was preserved at R. 110-111 and 196:11-45; see also R. 195:47-50.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 (2003) and 77-38a-101 to -302 (2003) (concerning restitution); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (2003) (defining unlawful dealing of
property by a fiduciary); Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 2007) (concerning withdrawal
of a plea); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l, et. seq. (2003 & Supp. 2007) (concerning plea in
abeyance agreements); and Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (2008) (concerning plea agreements).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
On February 3, 2004, the State filed an Information against Gibson for count one,
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, and count two, theft by deception, both
second degree felony offenses. (R. 3-5). In May 2004, Gibson waived a preliminary
hearing (R. 13), and on June 21, 2004, Gibson and the State entered into a plea agreement. (See R. 14). Gibson pled guilty to count one, the State dismissed count two, and
the trial court agreed to hold the plea on count one in abeyance for 36 months. (See R.
14; 19-29 ). Thereafter, the court set the matter for a restitution hearing on October 8.
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Prior to the hearing, Gibson filed papers with the court regarding her financial
circumstances. (R. 32-36). Gibson indicated she would make payments toward
restitution on a monthly basis in the amount $1,500 and she requested a continuance to
get other finances in order. (R. 32-34). The trial court denied the request for a
continuance and held the hearing as scheduled. (R. 37). At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court ordered Gibson to pay $238,184.92 in restitution, and it ordered Gibson to pay
"at the rate of at least $2,500.00 per month beginning November 30, 2004, and on the last
day of each month thereafter." (See R. 40 (dated October 12, 2004)). Gibson objected to
the amounts in restitution. (See R. 195:47-48, 49-50).
On January 4, 2005, the State filed a motion for an order to show cause and
relating papers (see R. 51-56), and on February 28, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on
the matter. It ruled that Gibson violated the plea agreement, and it terminated the plea in
abeyance, reinstated the plea on count one, and ordered probation for 36 months. (See R.
62-64). Also, the court acknowledged $38,916.17 in trust for restitution, reduced the
total accordingly, and ordered Gibson to make further payments in the amount of $2,500
per month beginning April 30, 2005. (R. 63-64 (dated March 3, 2005)).
In March 2006, the State served another motion for order to show cause, again
alleging that Gibson had failed to make restitution payments. (R. 70-78). According to
the State's papers, Gibson made payments sufficient through October 30, 2005, and in the
amount of $18, 316.29. However, "Defendant has made no further payments." (R. 71).
In connection with those proceedings, Gibson requested court-appointed counsel
(see R. 85), and she asked to withdraw the original guilty plea. (See R. 89-90 (stating
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that at the time of the agreement Gibson was not advised of the amount in restitution);
110-20). In response, the State did not dispute that Gibson was not informed of
restitution amounts (see R. 130, ^ 3-4); according to the State, it was not required to
disclose such amounts. (See R. 134-35).
On October 2, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing on the matter. It
considered the motion to withdraw to be timely, but denied the motion on the merits. (R.
141-51). On March 17, 2008, the trial court entered judgment against Gibson. The court
sentenced Gibson to a suspended prison term, and ordered her to serve 30 days in jail
followed by 12 months probation. (R. 178-80). On April 8, 2008, Gibson appealed. (R.
183). The appeal is timely. Gibson is not incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State Charged Two Counts in This Case. Count One Dealt with Violations
of a Fiduciary Duty and Count Two Dealt with Using Deception to Obtain a
Loan and Related Mortgage.
In February 2004, the State filed an Information against Gibson alleging unlawful
dealing of property by a fiduciary and theft by deception, both second degree felony
offenses. (R. 3-5). In count one, the State alleged that between February 2000, and
February 2003, Gibson did the following:
[She] took monies entrusted to her and mismanaged them and used a power of
attorney to secure a loan against Melba Wisdom's property without her
permission. These acts involved a substantial figure of loss of over $5,000.00 to
Melba Wisdom.
(R. 4). In count two, the State alleged that on or about October 8, 2003, Gibson
committed theft by deception as follows:
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[She] used an invalid power of attorney to secure a $93,000.00 loan against Melba
Wisdom's home. The value of the credit, goods, services, or any other thing of
value was or exceeded $5,000.00.
(R. 5).
The Parties Entered Into a Plea Agreement, Wherein Gibson Entered a Guilty
Plea in Abeyance on Count One, and the State Dismissed Count Two.
Gibson waived her right to a preliminary hearing (R. 13), and on June 21, 2004,
the parties and trial court entered into a plea in abeyance agreement in the matter. (See R.
17-29). The attorney for the State drafted the written agreement. (R. 19-29). According
to the executed materials, Gibson entered a guilty plea on count one for unlawful dealing
of property by a fiduciary. (R. 19, 24). The factual grounds for the plea were as follows:
"I took monies entrusted to me and mismanaged them and used a power of attorney to
secure a loan against Melba Wisdom's property without her permission.55 (R. 20); see
also State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) (stating counsel's statements in plea
hearing are not relevant).
As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed count two relating to the
$93,000 loan and mortgage against Wisdom's home. (R. 24).
In addition, the trial court agreed to hold the plea on count one in abeyance for 36
months while Gibson complied with certain conditions. (See, e.g., R. 24). The conditions
as reflected in the agreement at the time of the plea were as follows:
1. [Gibson] will plead guilty to Count I, Unlawful Dealing of Property by a
Fiduciary, a Second Degree Felony.
2. Count II, Theft by Deception, a Second Degree Felony, will be dismissed.
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this
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matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is
requested by the parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing
will cover the time period [April 7, 2002] to October 31, 2003.
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the
amount of $
. Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at
least $[
.00] per month, beginning one month from the date of the
restitution hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, Attention:
Linda Snow, 5272 College Drive, # 200, Murray, Utah 84123, for the benefit of
Melba Wisdom to the various credit cards and other creditors identified at the
restitution hearing.
5. I will be placed on probation for 36 months, during which time I will remain a
law abiding citizen.
6. The State recommends no incarceration as long as defendant is in compliance
with the terms of the Plea in Abeyance.
7. The case will be dismissed upon successful completion of these terms.
(R. 24; see also R. 196:6-7).
During the plea hearing, the prosecutor represented to the court that "the major
concern here, as explained to the Court, is there's a stipulated amount of restitution of
$55, 220, but that there are additional funds that the State claims were taken, that she says
- are accountable for and I believe we need a brief restitution hearing to determine how
much credit the Court is going to give for some of those services." (R. 196:2).
The court then reviewed the agreement with Gibson. The trial judge stated, "I
[want to] make sure you understand what is involved and then we will set [the case] for I will take the plea today, if that's what you wish to do and we'll set it for that restitution
hearing." (Id.) The judge advised Gibson of the presumption of "not guilty". (Id.) Also,
the judge advised that Gibson had "every right to go to trial," to put the State to its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id.) And she discussed the right to a jury
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trial (R. 196:2), a unanimous verdict, and the "benefit" of the plea in abeyance
agreement. (Id at 2-3). The trial judge stated, "You understand that. . .this [plea] is in
lieu of the trial and you're giving up all of the trial rights that are involved." (Id at 3).
The judge asked Gibson if anyone had coerced her into the agreement and Gibson
answered "No." (Id.) Gibson acknowledged that she reviewed the negotiations and the
document with counsel and she had no questions about the proceedings. (Id. at 3-4).
Also, Gibson responded in the affirmative when the judge asked the following:
You understand that there will not be the trial so you're not going to be able to
confront or cross examine witnesses, bring in witnesses on your own behalf;
you're giving up the right against self-incrimination and the presumption of
innocence and the appellate rights that are associated with going to trial by
entering into this resolution. Do you understand?
(Id at 4). The judge then discussed count one, and potential sentencing on a second
degree felony offense, including possible incarceration "from one to 15 years," a
"$10,000 fine," plus an 85% surcharge, and "any and all restitution would be part of any
sentencing as it would be part of the plea in abeyance agreement as well. Do you
understand that that could be the maximum sentence imposed and that [it is] ultimately
up to me as the sentencing judge to determine the fair sentence within that maximum.
You understand that as well?" (Id at 4-5) Gibson responded affirmatively.
The judge then asked if Gibson wished to enter into the agreement. Gibson
responded affirmatively. (Id, at 5). The judge accepted the plea on count one, signed and
dated the paperwork, then specified that she would not enter it "at this time," but would
hold it for a period of 36 months while Gibson remained on "informal probation." (Id at
6-7). Also, the judge stated,
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[I] am going to require as part of this plea in abeyance that you fully and
completely pay restitution. The amount of $55,220 is due and owing in this matter
at the time as part of the negotiation today. There may still be some concerns
about further restitution during the time period of April 7th, 2002 through October
31 st of 2003 and I understand that both parties wish an opportunity to gather some
documentation to get some information on that restitution amount and so I am
going to set that for a restitution hearing upon everyone's request in the October
time frame.
(R. 196:7). The judge scheduled the matter for a restitution hearing and specified the
following:
[THE COURT:] [T]he only concerns that the Court will have on that restitution
hearing date are the amounts that cannot be agreed to. I think that's what we
addressed in chambers today.
Also the payments of the restitution will be under the supervision of the attorney
general's office. [The prosecutor], Mr. Farraway is going to set up a time payment
with Ms. Gibson and Mr. Bird that can begin immediately addressing the $55,000
part of the restitution. Clearly that will not have all been paid by the October
hearing anyway and so we can address any additional amount at that time, but I
want the State to prepare that document so that there is a schedule and the
payments can begin even now and not wait until the October restitution hearing
for payments to begin and they will be under the supervision of the attorney
general's office.
[MR. FARRAWAY]: Your Honor, if I may ask a question, I'm not aware of Ms.
Gibson's financial situation but would ask what amount that she feels she could
pay monthly at this point.
(Id. at 8-9). The judge responded that the parties would need to address that issue in good
faith and with "ambitious payments on this much restitution," since it constituted "a very
high amount." (Id.) Defense counsel suggested the court could determine the amount.
(Id. at 9-10). In response, the court specified the parties should "determine a monthly
amount" with payments to begin "by the last day of July and the last day of every month
and then if we need to modify those" during the October hearing, "we can do that." (Id.)
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The Court Held a Restitution Hearing.
On October 4, 2004, defense counsel asked the court to continue the restitution
hearing. In papers filed with the court, counsel maintained that Gibson had planned to
"make payments of $1,500 a month on credit card obligations which are an issue in this
case," and she had planned to make additional payments after refinancing loans on two
duplexes that she owned. (R. 32-33). However, when she applied for "further loans,"
she discovered a notice of lis pendens against the duplexes, followed by a delay in
refinancing that resulted in a default on the existing mortgages. (R. 33). According to
the papers, the events affected Gibson's ability to make payments on restitution. (R. 34).
Thus, counsel asked the court to continue the hearing until Gibson could refinance the
duplexes. (Id.) The prosecutor opposed the continuance (R. 30-31), and the trial court
rejected the request for a continuance and ordered the restitution hearing to be held as
scheduled, on October 8, 2004. (R. 37).
During the hearing the State presented evidence from Charles Haussler (identified
as "Hiesler" at R. 195), an investigative officer at the Utah Attorney General's Office.
(See 195:5). Haussler investigated allegations of elder exploitation involving Gibson and
her aunt, Melba Wisdom. (Id, at 6). He discovered credit card debt in the amount of
$55,221, as "stipulated to in the plea agreement." (Id at 7). Also, he interviewed Gibson
in July 2003 regarding bank accounts, a durable power of attorney that she held for her
aunt, and an appointment of guardian or conservatorship. (Id at 7-8).
According to Haussler, Gibson held a power of attorney for her aunt until July
2002, then it went to Wisdom's grand-niece, Veta Bottomly. (Id at 10; State's Exhibit
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2). Also, in June 2003, a court terminated Gibson as guardian or conservator for
Wisdom's estate. (R. 195:10-11; State's Exhibit 3).
Haussler testified that in October 2003, Gibson obtained a loan and related
mortgage from Western Mortgage Services Corporation and used Wisdom's home as
collateral. (R. 195:11). Gibson signed "as an attorney in fact" for Wisdom. (Id at 12).
The original loan was for $93,000, and "[c]urrently, it's in default" in the amount of
$101,659.92. (Id at 12-13, State's Exhibit 4).
Also, Haussler claimed that Gibson signed checks from Wisdom's bank account
and she used the money "for her personal benefit." (R. 195:15). Haussler audited
transactions from April 2002 to May 2003 (see id at 21), and "found $81,305 that had
been made out to Judy [Gibson] and signed by Judy, using Melba Wisdom's name or
cash withdrawals and I also found $3,412 made out to Community Self Storage for the
rent of nine storage units." (Id at 16; see also id. at 19-20 (stating he focused his
investigation on checks made specifically to Gibson); but see id. at 27, 38 (stating that
$30,000 of the amount related to the credit cards)).
When Haussler asked Gibson about the money, "[s]he told [him] she had spent
$7,000 for a car in January of 2003" and she placed "$30,000 in annuities to pay
mortgages on some property she owned on Girard Avenue." (Id at 17). She did not say
if any of it "went to the care of Melba Wisdom." (Id.)
Haussler testified that during his investigation, Gibson produced checks that she
had made for Wisdom's care and receipts for prescriptions, and she "said that she paid for
lawn care, taking care of the dogs and things like that, but she provided no receipts" for
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those items. (R. 195:18-19 (stating Gibson represented dog care to cost $75 a day;
prescriptions totaled $600; and car repair was $628); but see id. at 28 (stating
prescriptions were $1,600)).
After the parties presented evidence, the prosecutor asked for restitution in the
amount of $238,184.92 (id_ at 46-47, 56-57), which included the amount relating to the
loan and mortgage against Melba Wisdom's home. (Id.) In addition, the prosecutor
asked that the court order Gibson to make monthly payments of $5,000. (Id at 53).
Defense counsel objected to restitution for anything over $55,220 (id, at 47-48, 49-50),
and he advised the court that Gibson had originally agreed to pay $1,500 a month. (Id at
47). Moreover, defense counsel advised the court that monthly payments in the amount
of "$5,000" were "utterly impossible." (Id at 54).
The trial court indicated that at that point in the proceedings, it would not entertain
a motion to withdraw the plea and any such motion "needed to be made within 30 days of
the June 21st, 2004, date anyway." (Id at 51). The court then ordered restitution in the
amount of $238,184.92, and ordered Gibson to make monthly payments in the amount of
$2,500 "beginning the last day of November and the last day of every month." (Id at 5355, 57). The court ruled that Gibson would have to "meet those minimum payments of
$2,500 a month" to be "within the plea in abeyance agreement that you entered with the
Court" and "that's what I'm stating the restitution will be." (Id at 55).
The trial court acknowledged that "$1,500 was what was considered agreed upon
at the time" of the plea agreement, "but nothing's been paid and Ms. Gibson, you need to
understand that all of these other financial. . . resources that you're anticipating on, may
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or may not come in. That does not change your responsibility for paying $2,500 a month
to this restitution." (R. 195:56). "And it is a plea in abeyance and those are the
conditions for this plea in abeyance. If those conditions are not met, then the appropriate
next hearing is whether or not the plea should be entered and I should sentence you on
the second degree felony to which you pled guilty on June 21st of 2004." (Id.)
The court continued,
And again, that is the order of restitution in this case and the plea in abeyance
agreement is now modified . . . that is the order and . . . restitution is to be paid . . .
at least $2,500 a month. It is all done through the Medicaid fraud control units,
the payments still will go there and they need to and anything else that needs to be
addressed on this plea in abeyance will only be hearing it on whether or not the
conditions of the plea in abeyance are being met.
(Id. at 57; see also R. 40).
The Court Ruled that Gibson Violated the Agreement and It Entered a
Conviction.
Shortly after the restitution hearing, defense counsel filed a motion to amend the
restitution order, which the trial court denied (see R. 42-47 (dated November 3, 2004);
50), and the State filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause, alleging violations of the plea
agreement. (R. 51-56 (dated January 4, 2005)). According to the State's papers, Gibson
had failed to make payments toward restitution as ordered on October 8, 2004. (Id.) The
trial court entered minutes on the matter stating that Gibson "admitted the] allegations.
Court finds defendant] in violation [of] probation." (R. 62). Thereafter, on March 3,
2005, the trial court entered an order revoking the plea in abeyance, and ordering Gibson
to pay restitution. It also acknowledged "[t]he amount of $38,916.17 [in] trust for the
benefit of Melba Wisdom" to be credited, "leaving a balance owing of $199,268.75. Said
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restitution will be paid at the rate of at least $2,500.00 per month beginning April 30,
2005, and on the last day of each month thereafter." (R. 63-64).
In March 2006, the State served another Motion for Order to Show Cause, alleging
violations of probation. (R. 70-78). According to the State's papers, Gibson made
restitution payments of $18,316.29 and was current through October 30, 2005; however,
she failed to make payments after that date. (Id.)
In response to the State's papers, defense counsel moved to withdraw, and the
court appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to represent Gibson in the matter.
(R. 79, 85). Gibson then filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (See R. 89-120).
Gibson Made a Timely Motion to Withdraw the Plea Agreement; the Court
Denied the Motion.
After the trial court appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender to represent Gibson in the
matter, she filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and supporting papers. (See R. 89120 (dated June 2006)). According to the motion and supporting papers, Gibson felt
coerced when she entered the plea (see R. 89); Gibson did not fully understand that she
"had the option to go to trial" in the case at the time of the plea (see R. 89); and Gibson
had reservations about signing "a statement that left the restitution amounts blank and
without receiving written proof from the state as to the amounts owing." (R. 89-90).
Furthermore, Gibson "did not knowingly" or intelligently sign the agreement, where the
amount in restitution was not represented to her. (R. 90).
Gibson argued that the law required significant terms of the plea to be fully
disclosed at the time of the agreement (R. 114-15); and she maintained that while
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restitution was a significant and material term in the agreement, restitution amounts were
not set forth. (R. 115). Also, Gibson relied on principles of contract law and claimed
there was no meeting of the minds as to the terms of the agreement and restitution; and at
the time of the plea, the agreement between the parties was in dispute and incomplete in
material ways. (See R. 115-119 (citing State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44 (Utah 1982)). The
State opposed the motion to withdraw, but did not dispute Gibson's assertion that she was
not informed at the time of the plea of the amount in restitution that the State would
pursue. Indeed, the State seemed to claim that at the time of the plea disposition, it was
not required to disclose restitution under the law. (R. 134-35)
Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing. (See R. 196:11). The court specifically
determined that the motion to withdraw was timely, but it denied the motion on the
merits. (See R. 196:33-45). On December 4, 2006, the court entered written findings and
conclusions on the matter. (SeeR. 142-151); see also CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42,
<[ 33 n.2, 116 P.3d 366 (where trial court made pronouncements from the bench and also
entered written findings and conclusions, supreme court looked to latter). The findings
and conclusions are attached as Addendum C. On March 17, 2008, the trial court entered
judgment against Gibson (R. 178-82), and on April 8, 2008, Gibson appealed. (R. 183).
She is challenging the trial court's ruling on the motion to withdraw the plea agreement.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
After the State filed charges against Gibson for two second degree felony offenses,
the parties entered into a plea disposition and agreement. According to the agreement,
Gibson entered a guilty plea on count one and agreed to pay restitution in at least the
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amount of $55,220, with a later hearing to determine other disputed amounts; the State
dismissed count two; and the trial court agreed to hold the plea on count one in abeyance.
During the course of the plea hearing, the State represented that restitution was a major
concern. In fact, it was a primary term and condition of the plea disposition.
Several months after the plea hearing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
where the State requested restitution totaling $238,184.92. Gibson objected and the trial
court overruled the objection and ordered Gibson to pay the amount as part of the plea
agreement. Gibson subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the plea agreement, and the
trial court rejected that motion as well.
Gibson's appeal relates to those proceedings; she is asking this Court to reverse
the trial court ruling and to remand the case in order that she may withdraw the plea
agreement. Gibson has made her request on the following grounds.
First, according to Utah law, a prosecutor is required at the time of the plea
disposition to divulge actual and estimated amounts in restitution. The prosecutor in this
case failed to divulge that information; yet restitution was a major concern and relevant
term of the agreement. Since the prosecutor failed to divulge the information, Gibson was
prevented from entering into a knowing and voluntary plea. She should be allowed to
withdraw the plea agreement on that basis.
Second, at the time of the plea, the terms relating to restitution were ambiguous
and confusing. Specifically, the State did not disclose that it intended to pursue
restitution in the amount of $238,184.92, and for amounts identified in the dismissed
count two. Where the State failed to disclose its intent, and Gibson was not fairly
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apprised of the amounts in restitution that the State planned to pursue, the parties failed at
the time of the plea to reach a mutually desirable agreement with regard to a major term,
and their agreement lacked a meeting of the minds. Under Utah law the plea agreement
should be vacated. Gibson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court
ruling on the motion to withdraw and remand the case for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO
THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. THUS, GIBSON WAS
PREVENTED FROM UNDERSTANDING THE TERMS AT THE TIME
OF THE PLEA.
A. UNDER THE LAW, SIGNIFICANT TERMS IN A PLEA AGREEMENT
MUST BE EXPLICIT AND UNAMBIGUOUS. IN ADDITION, A
PROSECUTOR MUST DISCLOSE ANTICIPATED RESTITUTION
AMOUNTS AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA.
(1) A Plea Agreement Must Be Explicit and Unambiguous.
A trial court must ensure that a criminal defendant's plea is knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. See_ State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^f 9, 95 P.3d 276; see also State v.
Cornell 2005 UT 28, \ 11, 114 P.3d 569 (requiring trial court to establish that
defendant's plea is loiowing and voluntary); State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^ 22, 26 P.3d
203 (stating the purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure defendant's plea is knowing and
voluntary and he is aware of the consequences of a plea).
Also, a trial court must ensure that constitutional and state law requirements "are
complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis for that duty is found in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), where
the United States Supreme Court stated: 'What is at stake for an accused facing
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[punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing
the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea
connotes and of its consequence'" State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)
(emphasis added); see also U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process); Utah
Const, art. I, § 7 (same); Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ^f 10 (recognizing that the trial court
must ensure that the defendant understands the rights he is surrendering and that he has
voluntarily waived known rights); State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 11, 22 P.3d 1242
(stating that the trial court must ensure that "defendants know of their rights and thereby
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty").
The trial court must ensure at the time of disposition that the agreement is clear,
and that significant terms and conditions are explicit and unambiguous. See_ United States
v. Burns, 160 F.3d 82, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating "significant plea-agreement terms
should be stated explicitly and unambiguously so as to preclude their subsequent circumvention by either party55); State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^ 19, 69 P.3d 838 (stating
"'[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing,
as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy555) (cite omitted).
Under Utah law, Title 77, Chapter 2a governs plea in abeyance agreements. It
states the following:
(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the
defendant and approved by the court shall include a. full, detailed recitation of the
requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for
requesting the court to hold the plea in abeyance.
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be
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executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in
the presence of the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4) (2003) (emphasis added); see also id_ at §§ 77-2a-l(l)
(2003) (indicating "specific conditions" are "as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement"); 77-18-1(1) (2003) (stating a court may hold a plea in abeyance under the terms of
the agreement); 77-38a-102(7), (8), (9) (2003) (defining plea agreement and plea in
abeyance agreement for restitution as setting forth the "specific" and "special" terms and
conditions upon which the court will hold the plea in abeyance); State v. Turnbow, 2001
UT App 59, ^j 10, 21 P.3d 249 (defining a plea in abeyance agreement).
Also, Rule 11 governs plea agreements. It states that a court may not accept a plea
in a case until it has made findings as to "what agreement has been reached." Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (2008); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(l) (Supp. 2007) (requiring
trial court to comply with rule 11 when accepting plea in abeyance agreement). In that
regard, "[t]he trial judge should [still] review the statements in the affidavit with the
defendant, question the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other
requirements imposed by [rule 11] on the record" before accepting the plea. State v
LehU 2003 UT App 212, f 10, 73 P.3d 985 (bracketed language in the original) (quoting
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (stating a finding
regarding a plea agreement "may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record"
or a "written statement" where the court has established that defendant read, understood,
and acknowledged the statement).
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(2) A Prosecutor Is Required at the Time of the Plea Disposition to Disclose
Restitution; If Amounts Are in Dispute, the Defendant Is Entitled to a Hearing.
Under the law, a prosecutor must disclose restitution amounts at the time of an
agreement, as follows:
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony
or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal
attorney, or district attorney shall provide to the district court:
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution;
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time: and
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part
of the plea disposition.
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general. . . shall:
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution
amounts . . . .
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution
claims from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 3(a)
(2003 & 2008) (stating that notices, motions and pleadings shall be filed with the court
and served on other parties); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-201 (2003) (requiring law
enforcement to assess claims of restitution when conducting an investigation into
criminal conduct).
For purposes of restitution, the law defines "[p]lea agreement," "[p]lea in
abeyance," "[p]lea in abeyance agreement," and "[p]lea disposition".
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon
which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
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(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution
and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant
but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set
forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon
which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in
abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or
any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or
where charges are dismissed without a plea.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (2003).
Also, a trial court may order restitution as follows:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (2003); see also id at §§ 77-38a-301; 77-38a-302(l)
(2003). Moreover, the code defines "[c]riminal activities" to mean "any offense of which
the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct." Id at § 76~3-201(l)(b); see also id at §§ 77-38a-102(2) (2003); 7738a-302(5)(a); Slate v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1f 3, 987 P.2d 1289. Thus,
According to the plain language of the statute, restitution can include payment for
crimes not listed in the information so long as a defendant admits responsibility or
agrees to pay restitution. However, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay
restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit
responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution.
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State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 9, 60 P.3d 582 (cites omitted).
If the defendant disputes restitution or "objects to the imposition, amount, or
distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant
a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4). The trial court then may
conduct an evidentiary hearing at a later date where it will consider factors relevant to the
victim and to defendant's financial resources and ability to pay. Id_ at § 77-38a-302(5).
(3) Courts Construe Ambiguities in Plea Agreements Against the Government
and in Favor of the Defendant.
In construing plea agreements in criminal cases, "[mjany courts, including the
Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,55 have referred to them "as
contracts and have applied principles derived from contract law .'5 State v. Patience, 944
P.2d 381, 386 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing as examples Santobello v. New York 404 U.S.
257, 262 (1971); State v. West 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) (referring to contract law
in determining whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea)).
Indeed, "'[principles of contract law provide a useful analytic framework5 in cases
involving plea agreements.55 Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 (cite omitted).
However, there are limits to applying the principles. Id_ Courts have ruled that
contract principles "'cannot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law in the area of
plea bargaining.555 IcL (quoting United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir.
1980); see also United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 54L 542 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating
"[p]lea agreements are like contracts; however, they are not contracts, and therefore
contract doctrines do not always apply to them,55 and that "[t]his court has . . .
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acknowledged the inherent limits of the contract analogy") (emphasis in original)).
"c[P]lea agreements may require tempering in some instances.5" Patience, 944 P.2d at
387 fquoting People v. Evans, 673 N.E.2d 244, 247 (111. 1996)).
"For example, in interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, courts
may in certain circumstances hold the government to a higher standard than the
defendant."^ (citing United States v. Rinzlinz, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993)
("c[B]oth constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the government to a
greater degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or ambiguities in
plea agreements'") (quoting United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986))).
Also, courts will construe ambiguities in a plea agreement against the government
and in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523
(11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.
2002); In re Altro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999). That is because attorneys for the
government "generally draft[] the agreement" and the government "enjoys significant
advantages in bargaining power." Altro, 180 F.3d at 375. Moreover, unlike ordinary
contracts, a plea agreement requires a defendant to waive substantial constitutional rights.
Id. Thus, the defendant must be adequately warned of the consequences of the plea. See,
e.z. Jeffries, 908 F.2d at 1523.
As with contract law, if there is disagreement as to the terms of the plea, the
parties may be put back into their original pre-plea positions. In State v. Bickley, 2002
UT App 342, the defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement as follows:
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Defendant pleaded "guilty to the Count I of the Information and agree[d] that total
victim restitution be entered in the amount of my obligation for child support
arrears . . . with the understanding that the amount of court[-]ordered restitution
and monthly [payments] remain to be determined by the court.5'
Id, at T| 3 (ellipsis in original). Thereafter, defendant filed a motion asking the court to
limit the award "to the dates specified in [the] Amended Information and plea agreement." Id_ at TJ 4. The court denied the motion and ordered restitution for a period predating the Information and totaling approximately $32,000. Id_ Defendant appealed. IcL
On review, this Court recognized that the parties disagreed as to the meaning of
the phrase, "total victim restitution." IdL at \ 11. Thus, it looked to restitution law, id_ at
ffi[ 8-9, contract law, id_ atfflf14-15, and a record of the proceedings for guidance, and it
stated the following:
Based on our review of the plea agreement and the record, we cannot say that
responsibility for all arrearages [was] firmly established. See_ [State v. ]Mast, 2001
UT App 402 at If 18, 40 P.3d 1143; \State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at \ 5,
987 P.2d 1289. "Without making inferences as the trial court did, it cannot be said
that [Defendant in this case] admitted responsibility for" restitution prior to 1997.
Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at \ 5, 987 P.2d 1289. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court erred in requiring Defendant to pay restitution for arrearages outside
the time period alleged in the Amended Information.
I_dL&\ 12.
In addition, it ruled there was "no meeting of the minds as to the meaning of 'total
victim restitution.'" IcL at ^J 15. "Therefore, the parties failed 'to reach a mutually
desirable agreement.'" Id_ (quoting West, 765 P.2d at 896 (discussing how contract law
principles are applicable to plea agreements); see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 31
(1991) ("Where after the parties have apparently agreed to the terms of a contract,
circumstances disclosed a latent ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which
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one of the parties meant one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to
the essence of the supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract.") (footnote
omitted)).
For a remedy, it looked to language in State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44 (Utah 1982). It
stated, "The court should understand clearly and make sure the parties understand clearly
the terms which they have agreed to before acting upon the [plea] agreement. Where
there is an error, frequently it can be most easily corrected by placing the parties in their
original positions. As long as the defendant retains constitutional protections, no harm
need be suffered." Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, f 16 (quoting Bero, 645 P.2d at 47).
Notably, the defendant in Bickley did not ask to withdraw his plea, and he did not
request such a remedy in the trial court or on appeal. See, e.g., id. at^flf 13-15.
Nevertheless, in Bickley, this Court ruled that "both parties to the plea agreement lacked
clear understanding of certain terms to which they allegedly agreed. If an agreement is
reasonably disputed, or if there is some misunderstanding, it is the responsibility of the
trial court to assure that the agreement is clear to all parties before ordering restitution
beyond that alleged in the information." IcL at ^J 16 (citing Bero, 645 P.2d at 47).
Since "both parties lacked a clear understanding of what was meant by total victim
restitution, this situation 'can be most easily corrected by placing [Defendant and the
State] in their original positions.'" IdL (bracketed language in original) (citing Bero, 645
P.2d at 47); see also United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that an ambiguity "in an essential term or a mutual mistake about the meaning of
such a term can invalidate" a plea agreement), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 156 (1996).
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The Bickley case, the law concerning plea agreements, and the Utah restitution
statutes govern this matter. This Court may apply established law to this case and undo
the plea agreement, as further set forth below.
B. THE STATE WITHHELD PERTINENT INFORMATION AT THE TIME OF
THE PLEA AGREEMENT; CONSEQUENTLY, GIBSON WAS NOT
PROPERLY INFORMED. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE, GIBSON
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA AND RETURNED TO
HER PRE-PLEA POSITION.
The parties entered into an agreement to resolve criminal charges. The attorney
for the State drafted the agreement. (See R. 19-29). According to the agreement, Gibson
entered a guilty plea on count one for unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary (see R.
19, 24); and the State dismissed count two for theft by deception. (See R. 24; 145, \ 5
(findings of fact)). In connection with the agreement, the trial court advised Gibson that
she was giving up certain constitutional rights (R. 196:2-4) and the court asked whether
Gibson was coerced or under undue influence in entering into the agreement. (IdL at 3).
Gibson answered she was not. (R. 196:3; 145, ^j 7)
In addition, at the time of the plea, the parties agreed that Gibson would pay
restitution on count one in the amount of $55,220; however, the parties acknowledged a
dispute over "other amounts" in restitution for the "time period April 7, 2002 to October
31, 2003." (R. 24; 144, ^ 4). The parties requested a restitution hearing. According to the
agreement, the trial court would determine the amount in restitution, and Gibson would
make monthly payments. (R. 24; 144, If 4); see, Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 3.
During the plea hearing, the prosecutor represented that restitution was a "major"
concern. (R. 196:2). However, the prosecutor did not disclose the amounts in restitution
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he intended to pursue. (See R. 196:1-10; 19-29; see also R. 89-90). That was improper.
Since he did not disclose the amounts, Gibson was not informed of a relevant term of the
agreement at the time of the plea. (Infra, Argument B.(l)). Where she was not advised of
relevant information, the plea was not voluntary, knowing or intelligent. (Id.) In addition,
the lack of information made the agreement ambiguous. (Infra, Argument B.(2)).
Gibson should have been allowed to withdraw the plea agreement. For purposes
of this appeal, Gibson does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, where the
findings are a recitation of the proceedings as already set forth in the record. (See R. 14347). Instead, Gibson maintains that the trial court failed to properly apply the law. (See
infra, Arguments B.(l) and (2), herein). Thus, this Court may review the issue under a
correctness standard. See Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^ 10.
(1) The State's Failure to Disclose Restitution Amounts at the Time of the Plea
Agreement Prevented Gibson from Understanding or Knowing the
Consequences of the Plea, or Relevant Terms of the Agreement That Was
Error. Based on the Circumstances, Gibson Was Prevented from Entering into
a Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent Plea Agreement.
Courts have ruled that a defendant must be informed at the time of the plea of
restitution amounts since such amounts are part of sentencing and a consequence of a
guilty plea. See State v. King, 759 P.2d 1312, 1314 (Ariz. 1988) (stating a "defendant
cannot voluntarily and intelligently enter a plea agreement where he does not know the
amount of restitution, and it is relevant and material to his decision to plea"); State v.
Chapman, 362 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that while the record
disclosed that the parties would leave restitution to the trial court, $31,000 was substantial; "we do not believe that a plea agreement, voluntarily and intelligently entered into,
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should include such a gamble on the amount of restitution"); State v. Tracy, 869 P.2d 425
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that restitution is a direct consequence of a plea).
Also, advising a defendant of restitution amounts at the time of the plea is
consistent with the trial court's duty to ensure that the plea agreement is knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent (see, e.g., Dean, 2004 UT 63, U 9; Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ^ 11;
Visser, 2000 UT 88, If 11; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)); that
relevant terms and conditions of the plea agreement are explicit, clear, and unambiguous
(see Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-2(4) (stating a plea in abeyance agreement shall include a
full, detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions); 77-2a-l(l); 77-18-1(1); 7738a-102(7), (8), (9); see also Burns, 160 F.3d at 83 (recognizing terms should be explicit
and unambiguous)); that any omissions or ambiguities are clarified (see, e.g., Lehi, 2003
UT App 212, | 10; Mora, 2003 UT App 117, \ 19; see also Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, If
16 (stating if an agreement is reasonably disputed or there is a misunderstanding, "it is
the responsibility of the trial court to assure that the agreement is clear to all parties
before ordering restitution beyond that alleged in the information")); and that the
defendant is aware of the consequences of his plea (see e.g., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44;
Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 9; Martinez, 2001 UT 12, Tf 22; State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464 (Utah
1989) (ruling that failure to advise defendant of consequences of the plea required an
order vacating the plea); see also supra, Argument A.(l), herein).
Under Utah law, restitution is a direct consequence of a plea to which defendant
must be sufficiently informed. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, ^f 19, 170
P.3d 1141 (recognizing that restitution serves many purposes including rehabilitation and
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deterrence); State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194, ^ 8, 163 P.3d 707 (recognizing that
restitution serves as criminal punishment and rehabilitation); see also Utah Code Ann. §§
77-2a-2(4) (stating plea in abeyance agreement shall include full detailed recitation of
requirements and conditions); 77-38a-102(7), (8), (9); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6).
According to the law, parties in a criminal case may enter into a plea agreement when
restitution is in dispute, and the trial court may resolve restitution issues at a separate
hearing after the plea. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-203(2)(c); 77-38a-302(4).
Also, the law requires the prosecutor at the time of the plea to divulge the amount
in actual or estimated restitution that the State has calculated against the defendant. It
states, "At the time of entry of. . . any plea disposition of a felony," an assistant "attorney
general" shall divulge "the actual or estimated" amount in restitution. Utah Code Ann. §
77-38a-202(l)(b); see also id_ at § 77-38a-102(10) (defining plea disposition). In
addition, the prosecutor must disclose "whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay
the restitution specified as part of the plea disposition." IcL at § 77-38a-202(l)(c).
Moreover, the law requires the assistant attorney general to comply with statutory
provisions in computing "actual or estimated restitution." Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-3 8a202(2) (in computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general shall use criteria
set forth in Section 77-38a-302); 77-38a-302. Thereafter, if the defendant disputes the
amount in restitution, "the court shall set a hearing date to resolve the matter." Id. at §
77-38a-203(2Xc); see also id. at § 77-38a-302(4).
In this case, the trial court failed to hold the prosecutor to the requirements under
state law. Specifically, at the time of the plea disposition, the trial court advised Gibson
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that as part of the sentence on a second degree felony offense and as part of the
agreement in this case, she would have to pay any and all restitution. (R. 23; 196:4-5).
Also, the parties agreed that Gibson would pay restitution in the amount of "at least
$55,220". (R. 24; 144,1] 4). The parties acknowledged in the agreement that "other
amounts" in restitution were in dispute, and they requested a restitution hearing, where
the trial court would determine restitution for the period from April 7, 2002 to October
31, 2003. (R. 24; 144, f 4); see Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 3.
Notably, the agreement in this case did not relieve the prosecutor of the duty to
disclose actual and estimated restitution amounts at the time of the plea disposition. (See
R. 19-29; 144-45,ffl[3-7); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l)(b); see also Gibbons, 740
P.2d at 1312 (recognizing the trial court must ensure compliance with the law).
Indeed, the record supports that at the time of the plea hearing, the prosecutor
possessed facts concerning actual and estimated restitution. According to the record, the
trial court conducted the plea hearing in June 2004. (See R. 196:1-10; 144-45,ffi[3-7).
Approximately one year earlier, in July 2003, an officer with the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Charles Haussler, interviewed Gibson. (R. 195:5-7 (identifying Haussler as
"Hiesler")). Haussler discussed financial matters and bank accounts relating to Melba
Wisdom. (R. 195:7-8, 15-16). He discussed "several total[]" amounts of money with
Gibson, and he asked her about funds in the amount of $81,305 and "what [the amount]
had been used for and what permission she had to use it." (Id at 16-17). According to
Haussler, at the time of the interview, Gibson disclosed that she used funds "[f]or
herself; she did not say if funds went to the care of Wisdom. (Id at 17).
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Thereafter, in February 2004, the State filed the charges in this case against
Gibson. (R. 3-5; 143, ^f 1). The State based the charges on information obtained from
Haussler, among others. (R. 5); see also State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984)
(stating that information known to State officers is charged to the prosecutor since
officers are part of the prosecution team).
The State maintained that for count one, Gibson violated fiduciary duties and
mismanaged properties belonging to Melba Wisdom, and the "acts involved a substantial
figure of loss of over $5,000.00 to Melba Wisdom." (R. 4). Also, for count two, the
State maintained that Gibson committed theft by deception in obtaining a loan and a
mortgage against Wisdom's home in the amount of $93,000. (R. 4-5; see also R. 143, \
1). The amounts alleged in the information were significant.
Shortly after the State filed the charges, in June 2004, the parties entered into the
plea agreement. (See, e.g., 143-44, <[fl( 1-7; see also R. 19, 24 (reflecting plea in abeyance
on count one; an agreement to pay at least $55,220 in restitution; dismissal on count two;
and a "dispute over other amounts")). Yet at the time of the plea the State did not
disclose amounts in restitution. (See, e.g., R. 3-4 (where the State indicated in the
Information that count one involved a loss "of over $5,000"); 19-29; 196:1-10 (where the
State made no representation at the time of the plea concerning amounts it intended to
pursue for restitution); see also R. 89-90; 146-47, Tf 12 (where Gibson maintained that at
the time of the plea, she was not apprised of restitution amounts); see also R. 145, ^f 8
(reflecting that restitution hearing was held several months after the plea, and the State
presented information from an officer for restitution in the amount of $238,184.92)).
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It did not indicate that it intended to pursue $81,305 in funds; it did not indicate
that it intended to pursue the amount of $93,000 relating to the loan and mortgage against
Melba Wisdom's home as alleged in count two; and it did not indicate that it would
pursue restitution amounts totaling more than $235,000 against Gibson. (See R. 19-29;
196:1-10; 144-45,fflf3-7 (reflecting findings relating to agreement); 146-47, \ 12
(reflecting that Gibson filed a motion to withdraw plea agreement where the agreement
was not knowing or voluntary because she was not advised of restitution amounts)).
Since the State did not reveal pertinent information on the matter (see R. 19-29;
196:1-10), Gibson was deprived of the opportunity to know what she was getting into and
to appreciate the consequences of the plea. See_ Chapman, 362 N.W.2d at 404 (although
parties contemplated in agreement that trial court would decide restitution, defendant
should be allowed to withdraw plea agreement where amounts were not specified and
were substantial); see also State v. Weston* 745 P.2d 994, 995-96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(ruling defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent: although he did not know specific
amount at plea hearing, he was supplied with "range cap" that enabled him to understand
what the plea entailed).
Considerations of fairness compel the determination that the prosecutor should
have divulged restitution information as required by law (see Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a202(1 )(b) (stating the prosecutor "shall" disclose "actual or estimated" amounts in
restitution at the time of "any plea disposition of a felony"); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312
(requiring trial court to comply with the law in accepting a plea)), and pertinent to the
parties in order that the agreement may be knowing and voluntary for both parties. (See
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supra, Argument A.(l), herein). Where the prosecutor failed to make disclosures on
actual or estimated restitution at the time of the plea disposition, Gibson was prevented
from making a laiowing and voluntary plea as it related to a major term in the agreement.
If Gibson had been apprised of the amount in restitution the State intended to
pursue, the information would have affected her decision as it related to the plea
agreement since the amount was something she would not be able to pay. (See, e g., R.
195:48, 49-50, 54 (disputing restitution amounts and amounts above $55,220); 118-19
(stating amounts to be paid influenced Gibson's decision); see also R. 62-64 and 71
(reflecting $38,916.17 in trust or credit for restitution and payments of $18,316.29 for a
total from Gibson of $57,232.46*); 196:18). Gibson would have recognized the futility
and impossibility of the agreement. (See, e.g., R. 195:48, 49-50, 54; 196:18).
Based on the circumstances, the plea agreement was not knowing, voluntary, or
intelligent. See, e.g.. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311 (remanding case to allow defendant to
make a motion to withdraw plea); see also Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^f 22 (requiring trial
court to ensure a laiowing and voluntary plea and that defendant is aware of conse-

1

When Gibson filed the motion to withdraw the plea agreement in June 2006, the total
paid in restitution exceeded the court-ordered payment schedule. Specifically, in June
2004, at the time of the plea disposition, the court ordered Gibson to begin making
monthly payments at the end of July 2004. (See R. 196:9-10; see also 195:56 (acknowledging monthly payments were set at $1,500)). Then in October 2004, the Court ordered
Gibson to begin making monthly payments in November 2004 at $2,500 per month. (See
R. 195:57). For purposes of computing restitution, Gibson was required to pay $1,500
per month from July through October 2004 (for a total of $6,000); and $2,500 per month
from November 2004 through May 2006 (for a total of $47,500), before she filed the
motion to withdraw on June 22, 2006. (See R. 110-20 (motion to withdraw)). To be current in June 2006, Gibson was required to have paid $53,500 total. Yet as of June 2006,
she had a credit and payments totaling $57,232.46 for restitution. (See R. 62-64; 71).
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quences); Boykin, 395 U.S. 238 (requiring a knowing and voluntary plea); State v.
Lukens, 729 P.2d 306 (Ariz. 1986) (recognizing defendant must be informed of higher
amounts in restitution for plea agreement to be voluntary and intelligent); Chapman, 362
N.W.2d at 404 (allowing withdrawal of plea where defendant was not apprised of
substantial amounts in restitution). The trial court should have allowed Gibson to
withdraw the plea. (See R. 89-90; 110-20 (requesting withdrawal of the plea)). Where
the trial court denied the motion to withdraw, its ruling was in error.
(2) Since the State Failed to Disclose Actual or Estimated Restitution Amounts
at the Time of the Plea Agreement, a Major Term of the Agreement Was
Confusing and Ambiguous. The Failure to Disclose Rendered the Agreement
Invalid.
Next, the plea agreement was ambiguous, misleading, and confusing with respect
to restitution. At the time of the plea hearing, Gibson agreed to plead guilty to count one,
she agreed to pay restitution on that count in the amount of at least $55,220 (R. 19, 24),
the State agreed to dismiss count two, and the trial court agreed to hold the plea on count
one in abeyance. (See R. 19, 24). According to the agreement, the parties disputed other
amounts in restitution and they requested a hearing on the matter. (See R. 24).
Since the issue of restitution was unresolved at the time of the plea, the parties
entered into the agreement without any understanding as to the specific terms and
conditions for actual or estimated restitution, and they "failed 'to reach a mutually
desirable agreement'" on that relevant provision. See_ Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 15,
16 (stating if agreement is disputed or there is some misunderstanding, trial court must
ensure clarity before ordering restitution beyond amounts alleged in information); (see
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also R. 115-19 (arguing that the agreement lacked a meeting of the minds; primary
information about restitution was not disclosed in plea negotiations)).
Specifically, Gibson was not informed at the time of the plea that the State would
seek restitution totaling more than $235,000. (See R. 19-29; 196:1-10; see also, e.g., R.
144-45, TH| 3-7 (reflecting plea proceedings); R. 89-90, 114-15, and 119 (requesting withdrawal of the agreement where pertinent amounts in restitution were not disclosed to
Gibson)). Indeed, the State did not disclose - either in the written papers that it prepared
or otherwise at the time of the plea - that it intended to pursue restitution in such
amounts. (See, e.g., R. 3-4 (alleging losses on count one of "over $5,000"); see also R.
19-29; 196:1-10 (making no disclosure with respect to amounts State would seek in
restitution); 196:2 (claiming restitution as a "major" concern)).
Likewise, it did not disclose its full intent with respect to count two. That is, the
State agreed to dismiss that count. (R. 24; 145, \ 5). Thus, based on the circumstances, it
would have been reasonable at the time of the agreement for Gibson to assume that
restitution "would be limited [to the statutory amount] on the only crime to which she
pled guilty and was convicted." Lukens, 729 P.2d at 307; see also Watson, 1999 UT App
273, Tffl 4-5 (ruling that plea for obstruction of justice did not require defendant to pay
restitution for murder).
Yet the State did not limit restitution in that regard. (See R. 195:12, 46 (requesting
restitution in the amount of the loan/mortgage on the home)). Since the State did not
disclose its intent for restitution at the time of the plea, Gibson was prevented from
understanding specific terms and conditions for actual or estimated restitution. See.
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Chapman, 362 N.W.2d at 404. The circumstances here rendered the agreement
ambiguous, misleading, and confusing. See, e.g., Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^j 16.
In addition, based on this record, the restitution amounts relating to count two
were improper as a matter of law. Pursuant to Utah law, a court may order restitution
"[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages"; or the court may order "the defendant [to] make restitution to the victims" for
conduct for which the defendant has admitted responsibility, or for conduct for which the
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-20l(4)(a); see also id at §§ 76-3-201(l)(b) (defining "[criminal activities" to mean
"any offense [for] which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an
admission of committing the criminal conduct"); 77-3 8a-102(2) (same); 77-38a-302(5)(a)
(same); 77-38a-302(l); Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,1f 9 (recognizing that a defendant
"cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did
not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution").
In this case, Gibson was not convicted of criminal activity relating to the loan and
mortgage on the home; she did not agree to make restitution for amounts relating to the
loan and mortgage; and she did not admit responsibility for criminal activity relating to
the loan and mortgage on the home. Indeed, Gibson admitted to unlawful dealing of
property by a fiduciary. (See R. 3-4; 19; 24). That offense is defined as follows:
(2) A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary if he
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of a
governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner
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which he knows is a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of
loss or detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was
entrusted. A violation of this subsection is punishable under Section 76-6-412.
(3) (a) A person acting as a fiduciary is guilty of a violation of this subsection if,
without permission of the owner of the property or some other person with
authority to give permission, he pledges as collateral for a personal loan, or as
collateral for the benefit of some party, other than the owner or the person for
whose benefit the property was entrusted, the property that has been entrusted to
the fiduciary.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 22-1-1 (2007)
(defining fiduciary); State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1190-91 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(construing statute to require evidence of a relationship of confidence and trust).
Gibson entered a plea in abeyance on count one for criminal activity as follows:
I did knowingly or intentionally deal with property that had been entrusted to me
as a fiduciary, or property of a governmental entity, public monies, or of a
financial institution, in a manner which I know was a violation of my duty and
which involved substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner or to a person for
whose benefit the property was entrusted; and/or acting as a fiduciary, without
permission of the owner of the property or some other person with authority to
give permission, of the owner of the property or some other person with authority
to give permission, pledged as collateral for a personal loan, or as collateral for the
benefit of some party, other than the owner or the person for whose benefit the
property was entrusted, the property that has been entrusted to the fiduciary.
(R. 20 (emphasis added)).
Also, according to the plea agreement, the factual grounds for the conviction on
count one were as follows: Gibson "took monies entrusted to me and mismanaged them
and used a power of attorney to secure a loan against Melba Wisdom's property without
her permission." (R. 20); see also Galli, 967 P.2d at 937 (stating counsel's statements in
plea hearing are not relevant); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988)
(stating the preferred method for ascertaining that defendant understands the nature and

36

elements of the charge is to have defendant "state in his own words his understanding of
the offense and the actions which make him guilty of the offense").
Notably, those same elements were not pertinent to criminal activity for the
$93,000 loan and mortgage on the home since the State charged that conduct as "theft by
deception." (R. 4-5 (identifying count two as relating to the $93,000 loan against the
home)). Under Utah law, a person commits theft by deception if he commits theft and
"obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to
deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (2003); see also State v. Fowler,
745 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating theft by deception does not require proof
of "unauthorized control"). The offense requires proof of false pretences. See Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-405(1).
In this case, Gibson did not admit to false pretenses or deception. (See R. 19-29;
196:1-10 (plea agreement)). She acknowledged that she mismanaged property entrusted
to her and used a power of attorney to secure a loan against property without permission,
for breach of a fiduciary duty. (See R. 20); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(2)(a), (3). That
is fundamentally different from misrepresenting yourself as a fiduciary in order to obtain
authorization or permission, as evidenced by the fact that the State charged the conduct
under two separate statutes. (See R. 3-5).
For purposes of this case, conduct under the statute set forth at count one
contemplates an existing actual relationship of trust, and a breach (see R. 3-4; Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-513(2)(a), (3); Winward, 907 P.2d at 1191); while conduct under the statute
alleged at count two contemplates a misrepresentation about a fiduciary relationship
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where no relationship existed. (R. 3-5; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1)). Gibson did not
admit to misrepresenting herself or using false pretenses for the purpose of depriving the
owner of the loan. (See R. 20 (stating she acted as fiduciary); 195:36 (reflecting Gibson's
testimony where she did not admit to false pretenses, but maintained she believed she
could obtain a mortgage as "successor trustee")); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1)
(defining theft by deception).
In addition, to the extent the State presented evidence at the restitution hearing to
support false pretenses or deception, that is immaterial for purposes of restitution:
pursuant to Utah law, a defendant "cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal
activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did
not agree to pay restitution." Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^j 9 (emphasis added); see also
Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ^f 5 (stating a trial court may not make inferences about
evidence for purposes of ordering restitution); Chapman, 362 N.W.2d at 404 (stating "we
are concerned" that restitution includes amounts for a dismissed count).
Thus, where Gibson did not admit responsibility for theft by deception, was not
convicted of theft by deception, and did not agree to pay restitution for obtaining a mortgage under circumstances constituting theft by deception, the restitution for amounts in
count two was improper. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(l)(b); see also Bickley, 2002
UT App 342, \ 10 (allowing restitution if "responsibility for the criminal conduct" is
"firmly established").
Finally, even if an argument could be made to support a restitution order for the
$93,000 loan, the fact remains that Gibson did not know at the time of the plea that the
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State would pursue such restitution since it had dismissed count two. (See, e.g., supra,
Argument A.(l), herein (requiring a knowing and intelligent plea); R. 3-5; 19-29
(reflecting count two as relating to the $93,000 mortgage; and reflecting dismissal of
count two); see also R. 144-45,fflf3-7 (reflecting plea proceedings); see also R. 89-90;
146-47, ^[ 12 (reflecting Gibson's motion to withdraw where she was not apprised of
amounts in restitution at the time of the plea)).
In the end, the record supports that Gibson lacked information, and the parties
lacked a mutual understanding as to the amount in restitution that may be pursued. See
Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^J 15-16. "[T]he agreement between the parties in this case
was in dispute and incomplete.'5 (R. 117); see also Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 16
(stating if an agreement is disputed or there is some misunderstanding, trial court must
assure it is clear before ordering restitution beyond that alleged in information).
Under principles of contract law and fundamental fairness, any confusion and
ambiguity in a plea agreement must be construed in favor of the defendant and against
the government. See Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 (citing Ringling 988 F.2d at 506 ("c[B]oth
constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the government to a greater
degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements'") (quoting Harvey, 791 F.2d at 300)); see also Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3 at
989; Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jeffries, 908 F.2d at 1523. That is appropriate since the
prosecutor drafted the agreement here knowing that he would pursue restitution; yet he
failed to disclose the amounts he intended to pursue. (See R. 19-29; 196:1-10; see also
supra, Arguments A.(3) and B.(l), herein). Notwithstanding, the trial court agreed to
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order the State-requested restitution. (See R. 195:53-55). That was improper.
Indeed, Gibson was not informed at the time of the agreement of the State's intent
with respect to restitution. See_ Burns, 160 F.3d at 83 (recognizing that "significant pleaagreement terms should be stated explicitly and unambiguously so as to preclude their
subsequent circumvention by either party"); Mora, 2003 UT App 117, | 19 (stating
c

"[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing,

as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy'"). She was not
advised that the State intended to seek restitution for amounts specified in count two, and
in an amount totaling more than $235,000. (See R. 19-29; 196:1-10). Thus, there was no
meeting of the minds and no mutual understanding of a major term of the agreement. See
Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 15-16. Based on the circumstances, the trial court should
have allowed Gibson to withdraw the plea.
C. THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA WAS PROPER; AND
WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY.
When a trial court has erred in failing to give information required at the time of
the plea, Utah courts correct the error by giving the defendant an opportunity to vacate or
withdraw the plea. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311; see also State ex rel KM., 2007 UT
93,1f 32, 173 P.3d 1279; State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996); State v.
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). That is an appropriate remedy here for two
reasons. First, a defendant may be allowed to withdraw a plea agreement where the
validity of the plea is in question. See, e.g., Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-12; (see also
supra, Argument B.(l), herein).
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Second, the parties may be returned to their pre-plea positions where the plea is
susceptible to different interpretations and the defendant's understanding differs from that
of the other parties. See_ Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,fflf15-16 (reflecting no meeting of
the minds as to restitution; and ruling that the parties may be returned to their original
pre-plea positions) (citing Berv, 645 P.2d at 47; also, citing inter alia, 17A Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 31 (1991) ("Where after the parties have apparently agreed to the terms of a
contract, circumstances disclosed a latent ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word
by which one of the parties meant one thing and the other a different thing, the difference
going to the essence of the supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract.")
(footnote omitted)).
In this case, Gibson filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (R. 89-90; 11020). The motion was timely. In trial court proceedings, the State and the trial court
acknowledged as much. (See R. 143 (ruling that the motion was timely made and
recognizing the State's concessions regarding the timing of the motion)); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (Supp. 2007) (concerning timing of a motion to withdraw plea);
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f) (allowing trial court to extend time for filing motion to withdraw
guilty plea). In addition, the trial court here addressed the motion on the merits. (See R.
142-52); see also State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1052-53 (Utah 1991) (recognizing
that when the trial court addresses a matter on the merits, timeliness is not an issue); State
v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) (citing, inter alia, Matsamas)', State v.
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (stating if the trial court addresses the merits,
a waiver or timeliness argument is weakened).
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The motion to withdraw was appropriate; it would have accommodated the
remedy requested where Gibson asked the trial court to allow her to withdraw the original
plea in order that the parties may be returned to their original pre-plea positions. (See R.
110-20); see also Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, TJ16. Notwithstanding, the trial court
denied the motion. (See R. 151).
In connection with its ruling, the trial court found that after restitution
proceedings, "defendant did not file an appeal of the Court's restitution order or the
denial of defendant's motion to modify that order." (R. 146, ^ 9). Also, it found that
after it revoked the plea in abeyance agreement, "defendant did not appeal the court's
order with respect to the Order to Show Cause." (R. 146, ^ 10). Those findings are
immaterial to the remedy at issue here.
Under Utah law, an appeal for new restitution proceedings or an appeal from the
order revoking the plea in abeyance - as suggested in the trial court findings (see R. 146,
Tflf 9, 10) - would be insufficient. Indeed, in a similar case, this Court ruled that a
defendant would be entitled only to an order vacating the plea; he would not be entitled to
new restitution proceedings or some other remedy in the matter. See Bickley, 2002 UT
App 342,ffif13-15; see also Chapman, 362 N.W.2d at 404.
Since Gibson filed a timely motion asking the court to return the parties to their
pre-plea positions (R. 110-20), that was an appropriate request for the error in this case.
Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, Iflf 15-16. In addition, Gibson's timely motion to withdraw
the plea agreement - and the appeal here - has obviated the need for any additional,
multiple appeals as referenced in the findings of fact. (See R. 146,fflf9, 10); see also
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Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311 (recognizing that the current procedure may eliminate the
need for multiple appeals in the case). In short, this appeal will suffice, particularly
where the remedy at issue is to withdraw or vacate the plea agreement.
CONCLUSION
Gibson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the
motion to withdraw the plea, and remand for further proceedings.
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Defendant's Attorney(B) : HAVNER, GRETCREN P
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 2, 1945
Video
Tape Number:
S42
Tape Count: 10503 9
CHARGES
1. UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY FIDUCIARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/18/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY
FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate terra of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 041900692
Date:
Mar 17, 2008

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY
FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 3 0 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail*
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
NO ANKLE MONITORING, COtJRT DENIES DEFENSE MOTION FOR ANY OPTION TO
JAIL SENTENCE
Attorney Fees
Amount: $3 00,00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of; S L LEGAL DEFENDERS S L COUNTY ATTORNEY
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
RESTITUTION TO BE PURSUED CIVILLY, ANY CREDIT CARD ISSUES ARE NOT
APART OF CRIMINAL ACTION
ORDER OP PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 3 0 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail .
Defendant is to report by March 24, 2008 by 9 arm..
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
po not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using/ possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer,
violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
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treatment as d i r e c t e d by the Department of Adult P r o b a t i o n and
Parole.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
Participate in mental health counseling.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are i;sed, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
COMPLY WITH ALL A/D CLAUSES PER AP&P, COMPLETE MENTAL HEALTH
EVALUATION AND ANY RECOMMENDED TREATMENT PER AP&P, DEFT IS NOT TO
BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANYONES FINANCIAL NEED, DEFT NO ACCESS TO OTHERS
MONEY,
DEFT TO HAVE ANOTHER FAMILY MEMBER LIVING AT RESIDENCE WHILE LIVING
WITH MOTHER
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2003)
76-3-201 Definitions —Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties —
Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and
medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation
and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
1

(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(0 to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
2

(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation
expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a
warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i)
shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition,
to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to
which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose,
order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for
the extradition.
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration in the
county correctional facility before and after sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility; and
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section
64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county correctional
facility as a condition of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8).
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(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are:
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs
established under Section 64-13c-302; and
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the negotiated
reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2).
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred
by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an
inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213,
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered restitution
under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided under Subsections
77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv).
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection
(6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76- 1-304, the county shall reimburse
the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection
(6)(a).
(7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three
stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of
middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is
in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four
days prior to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report,
other reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation
or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the
4

upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding
aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child, object
rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes substantial
bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and
admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be
sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8) takes precedence
over any conflicting provision of law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 1981,
ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 1987, ch.
107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 1995, ch.
111,§ 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1;
1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 149, § 1; 1999, ch. 270, §
15; 2001, ch. 209, § 1; 2002, ch. 35, § 4; 2003, ch. 280, § 1.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-101 (2003)
77-38a-101 Title.
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act."
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-101, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 2.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (2003)
77-38a-102 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty; or
(c) a plea of no contest.
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution
to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution.
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and
medical expenses.
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the
defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance
1

agreement.
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which,
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where
charges are dismissed without a plea.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing,
insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a
governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law.
(12) (a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an
offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except
that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a
bounty hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the
public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been
commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14) (a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-102, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 3; 2003, ch. 278, § 2.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-201 (2003)
77-38a-201 Restitution determination -Law enforcement duties and responsibilities.
Any law enforcement agency conducting an investigation for criminal conduct which would
constitute a felony or class A misdemeanor shall provide in the investigative reports whether a
claim for restitution exists, the basis for the claim, and the estimated or actual amount of the
claim.
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-201, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 4.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003)

77-38a-202 Restitution determination —Prosecution duties and responsibilities.
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony or class A
misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall
provide to the district court:
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution;
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part of the
plea disposition.
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal
attorney, or district attorney shall:
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution amounts; and
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea disposition
all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which the defendant is charged.
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution claims from
victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-202, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 5.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 (2003)
77-38a-203 Restitution determination -Department of Corrections — Presentence
investigation.
(1) (a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report in accordance with
Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency involved shall provide
all available victim information to the department upon request. The victim impact
statement shall:
(i) identify all victims of the offense;
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the recommended
amount of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302, accompanied by a
recommendation from the department regarding the payment by the defendant of courtordered restitution with interest as defined in Section 77-38a-302;
(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim as a
result of the offense, and the seriousness and permanence;
(v) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a
result of the offense;
(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or the victim's
family as a result of the offense; and
(vii) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim
or the victim's family that the court requires.
(b) The crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the department upon request all
invoices, bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss of earnings, and out-of-pocket
loss. The crime victim shall also provide upon request:
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation or reimbursement from insurance
companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, or federal government
received as a direct result of the crime for injury, loss, earnings, or out-of-pocket loss;
and

1

(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number, drivers
license number, next of kin, and home and work address and telephone numbers.
(c) The inability, failure, or refusal of the crime victim to provide all or part of the
requested information shall result in the court determining restitution based on the best
information available.
(2) (a) The court shall order the defendant as part of the presentence investigation to submit
to the department any information determined necessary to be disclosed for the purpose of
ascertaining the restitution.
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of the requisite
information shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal or seek future amendment or
alteration of the restitution order predicated on the undisclosed information.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution
recommended in the presentence investigation, or if the department is unable to determine
the restitution for any reason, the court shall set a hearing date to resolve the matter.
(d) If any party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-203, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 6.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301 (2003)
77-38a-301 Restitution -Convicted defendant may be required to pay.
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution.

History: C. 1953, 77-38a-301, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 7.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (2003)

77-38a-302 Restitution criteria.
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining whether restitution
is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2)
through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses
caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the
court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed
by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the
court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
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(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating
to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in
bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim
and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death
of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of restitution if
the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as a
result of considering an order of restitution under this Subsection (5), substantially
outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. 1953, 77-38a~302, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 8; 2002, ch. 35, § 13; 2002, ch.
185, §51; 2003, ch. 285, § 1.
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-513 (2003)
76-6-513 Definitions -Unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary - Penalties.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Fiduciary" is as defined in Section 22-1-1.
(b) "Financial institution" means "depository institution" and "trust company" as defined in
Section 7-1-103.
(c) "Governmental entity" is as defined in Section 63-30-2.
(d) "Person" does not include a financial institution whose fiduciary functions are
supervised by the Department of Financial Institutions or a federal regulatory agency.
(e) "Property" is as defined in Section 76-6-401.
(f) "Public monies" is as defined in Section 76-8-401.
(2) A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary if he deals with
property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of a governmental entity,
public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner which he knows is a violation of his duty
and which involves substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner or to a person for whose
benefit the property was entrusted. A violation of this subsection is punishable under Section 766-412.
(3) (a) A person acting as a fiduciary is guilty of a violation of this subsection if, without
permission of the owner of the property or some other person with authority to give
permission, he pledges as collateral for a personal loan, or as collateral for the benefit of
some party, other than the owner or the person for whose benefit the property was
entrusted, the property that has been entrusted to the fiduciary.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a) is punishable as:
(i) a felony of the second degree if the value of the property wrongfully pledged is or
exceeds $5,000;
(ii) a felony of the third degree if the value of the property wrongfully pledged is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
1

(iii) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property is or exceeds $300, but is less
than $1,000 or the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, robbery, burglary with
intent to commit theft, or unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary; or
(iv) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property is less than $300.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-513, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-513; 1983, ch. 91, § 1; 1994,
ch. 70, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 19.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 2007)

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance,
shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless
the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection
(2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l (2003)
§ 77-2a-l. Definitions
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time,
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that
he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and
the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following acceptance
of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2 (2003)

§ 77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement—Negotiation—Contents—Terms of agreementWaiver of time for sentencing
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of judgment
of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon motion of both the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction
against the defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant within the time periods contained
in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a plea in abeyance and
at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any plea in abeyance agreement unless the
defendant shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court hearing relating to a
plea in abeyance agreement.
(4)(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the defendant
and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the requirements and
conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in
abeyance.
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the agreement
shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be executed by the prosecuting
attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in the presence of the court.
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months if the plea was to
any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea was to any degree of felony or to
any combination of misdemeanors and felonies.
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, before the court,
and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently waives time for sentencing as
designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3 (Supp. 2007)
§ 77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea—Powers of court
(l)(a) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement shall be done in
full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) In cases charging offenses for which bail may be forfeited, a plea in abeyance agreement
may be entered into without a personal appearance before a magistrate.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon finding that the
defendant has successfully completed the terms of the agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence for
a lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the case.
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a plea in abeyance
agreement, the court may reduce the degree of the offense or dismiss the case only as provided
in the plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant
for any lesser offense pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke
Section 76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense.
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the administration of the
plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on probation to the court under Section 7718-1.
(5) The terms of a plea in abeyance agreement may include:
(a) an order that the defendant pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee, with a surcharge
based on the amount of the plea in abeyance fee, both of which shall be allocated in the same
manner as if paid as a fine for a criminal conviction under Section 78-3-14.5 and a surcharge
under Title 63, Chapter 63a, Crime Victim Reparation Trust, Public Safety Support Funds,
Substance Abuse Prevention Account, and Services for Victims of Domestic Violence
Account, and which may not exceed in amount the maximum fine and surcharge which could
have been imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense;
(b) an order that the defendant pay restitution to the victims of his actions as provided in Title
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77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act;
(c) an order that the defendant pay the costs of any remedial or rehabilitative program required
by the terms of the agreement; and
(d) an order that the defendant comply with any other conditions which could have been
imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense.
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney not to agree to a plea in abeyance is
final.
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense against a victim who
is under the age of 14.
(8) Beginning on July 1, 2008, no plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a driving
under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502.
Laws 1993, c. 82, §5; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 5, eff.
May 6, 2002; Laws 2004, c. 203, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2004, c. 228, § 7, eff. July 1,
2006; Laws 2006, c. 341, § 9, eff. July 1, 2006.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3.1 (Supp. 2007)
77-2a-3.1. Restrictions on pleas to driving under the influence violations
(1) As used in this section, a "driving under the influence court" means an intensive judicially
supervised treatment program:
(a) as defined by rules of the Utah Judicial Council; and
(b) that has been approved by the Utah Judicial Council as a driving under the influence court.
(2)(a) A plea may not be held in abeyance in any case involving a driving under the influence
violation under Section 41-6a-502 that is punishable as a felony or class A misdemeanor.
(b) A plea to a driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502 that is punishable
as a class B misdemeanor may not be held in abeyance unless:
(i)(A) the plea is entered pursuant to participation in a driving under the influence court; and
(B) the plea is approved by the district attorney, county attorney, attorney general, or chief
prosecutor of a municipality; or
(ii) evidentiary issues or other circumstances justify resolution of the case with a plea in
abeyance.
(3) A plea to a driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502 may not be
dismissed or entered as a conviction of a lesser offense pursuant to Subsection (2)(b)(i) if the
defendant:
(a) has been convicted of any other violation which is defined as a conviction under Subsection
41-6a-501(2);
(b) has had a plea to any other violation of Section 41-6a-502 held in abeyance; or
(c) in the current case:
(i) operated a vehicle in a negligent manner proximately resulting in bodily injury to another or
property damage to an extent requiring reporting to a law enforcement agency under Section
41-6a-401;
1

(ii) had a blood or breath alcohol level of .16 or higher; or
(iii) had a passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 (2003)
77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement-Hearing—Entry of judgment and imposition of
sentence—Subsequent prosecutions
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, information comes to the
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has violated any condition of
the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion
and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before
the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the terms of
the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be terminated. If,
following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially
comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the
agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the
offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and
imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from any
offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original
plea was placed in abeyance.

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(2008)
Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or
not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In
cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the
requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering
the plea, these rights arc waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
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(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable,
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and
if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used,
a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been
read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77•13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the
court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition.
The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of
the plea.
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the
court.
(i)(l)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement
being made by the prosecuting attorney.
2

(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of
the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(i)(3) if the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with
the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant
to cither affirm or withdraw the plea.
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may
enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of
any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a103.
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole.
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
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STATE OF UTAH
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
Criminal No. 041900692

vs.
JUDY GIBSON,
Defendant.

Judge Ann Boyden

Defendant, Judy Gibson, filed a Motion to Withdraw her Guilty Plea to one count of
Exploitation of an Elder Adult, a Second Degree Felony. The State of Utah filed a written
memoranda in response to the motion and oral argument was heard on October 2, 2006. The
defendant was present and was represented by Gretchen Havner and Bevan Corry of the Salt
Lake Legal Defender's Office. The State of Utah was represented by Robert E. Steed, Assistant
Attorney General. Based upon the pleadings on file, the evidence adduced, and

argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby makes the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
JURISDICTION
The Court finds that defendant's Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea was timely made.
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to address defendant's motion. The Court notes that in
response to the defendant's motion, the State conceded that the notice contained in the plea
agreement pertaining to defendant's right to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea en'oneously
stated that the defendant had to file any motion to withdraw her guilty plea within thirty days of
the imposition of sentence. However, the law in effect when the plea was entered provided that
"For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2004). However, the State
suggested that the remedy for this error could be cured by allowing the defendant to file a motion
to extend the time to file her motion. The Court finds that based on the notice contained in the
plea agreement, defendant's motion was timely filed. Accordingly, the Court will address
defendant's motion on its merits.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 3, 2004, the State filed an Information charging the defendant with one
count of Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a second degree felony and one
count of Theft by Deception, a second degree felony.

2.

On April 5, 2004, the defendant made an initial appearance before the Court. Defendant
was represented by counsel, Richard L. Bird. On May 25, 2004, the defendant

-2-

\a^

knowingly waived her right to a preliminary hearing and the case was bound over for
trial
On June 21, 2004, the defendant appeared with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a Second Degree Felony. The
State and the defendant submitted a Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea in
Abeyance and Certificate of Counsel. The Court questioned the defendant to ascertain
whether she understood the legal consequences of entering a plea and to determine
whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. After the Court was satisfied
that the defendant was fully advised of her rights and consequences of entering a guilty
plea, the Court accepted the defendant's plea and found that it was knowingly and
voluntarily entered.
Page 6 of the written plea in abeyance agreement contains the following terms and
conditions that pertain defendant's obligation to pay restitution to the victim of her
conduct:

3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is
requested by the parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing
will cover the time period April 7,2002 to October 31, 2003.
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the
amount of $
. Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least
$
.00 per month, beginning one month from the date of the restitution
hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid Fraud Control U n i t . . .
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5.

In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to move to dismiss the remaining
count in the Information.

6.

Page 7 of the plea agreement contains the following notice of defendant's right to
withdraw her guilty plea:
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion
to withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgement
has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I
will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason.

7.

During the plea colloquy, the defendant denied at that time that she was under any undue
influence or coercion to plead guilty. The written plea agreement also contained
certification of voluntariness, attested to by the defendant, wherein she acknowledged that
she was voluntarily entering into a plea agreement with the State of her own free will and
choice and that no "force, threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made"
to compel her to plead guilty."

8.

On October 8, 2004, a restitution hearing was held and evidence was received by the
Court. The Court heard testimony from Officer Charles Haussler, an investigator with the
Medicaid Fraud Unit of the Attorney General's Office. The defendant was present with
counsel and also testified on her own behalf. Based on the evidence, the Court made
findings and ordered that the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $238,184.92.
Further, the Court ordered that the defendant make restitution payments of $2,500 per
month beginning on November 30, 2004.
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9.

On November 3, 2004, the defendant filed a Motion to Amend the Restitution Order.
The State responded in writing to the motion. After considering the merits of the
defendant's motion, the Court denied the motion on November 85 2006. (Docket at 5-6.)
The defendant did not file an appeal of the Court's restitution order or the denial of
defendant's motion to modify that order.

10.

On January 4, 2005, the State filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause with the Court
based on the defendant's alleged failure to make restitution payments. On February 28,
2005, an Order to Show Cause hearing was conducted and the defendant entered
admissions to the allegations contained in the State's motion. The Court revoked and
reinstated the defendant's plea in abeyance. (Docket at 6.) The defendant did not appeal
the court's order with respect to the Order to Show Cause.

11.

On April 14, 2006, the State filed a second Order to Show Cause. A hearing on the
State's motion was conducted on March 20, 2006. On that date, defendant's counsel,
Richard Bird, withdrew from the case. The Court continued the hearing and appointed
the Salt Lake Legal Defenders to represent the Defendant on March 28, 2006.

12.

On June 22, 2006, the second Order to Show Cause hearing was conducted. The State
presented evidence in support of its motion. On the same date, the defendant filed a
motion to withdraw her guilty plea claiming that her plea was not knowingly or
voluntarily entered based on the fact that the plea agreement failed to specify a final
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restitution amount. The defendant also claimed that her plea was involuntary because she
was coerced into signing the agreement by her former counsel, Richard Bird. The
defendant alleges via affidavit that her former counsel told her in June of 2004 that she
had the choice of entering the plea agreement or going instantly to jail.
13.

Oral argument on defendant's motion to withdraw was heard on October 2, 2006. Both
the State and the defendant were also permitted to provide evidence in support or against
the defendant's motion. The defendant did not provide any additional evidence
pertaining to her claim that she was coerced by former defense counsel, Richard Bird,
into entering the plea agreement on June 21, 2004. Further, defense counsel advised the
Court that the State did not need to call Richard Bird to testify concerning defendant's
claims of coercion though Mr. Bird was present and available to testify. No additional
evidence was introduced at the hearing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The issue before the Court is whether the defendant's guilty plea on June 21, 2004 was

knowingly and voluntarily entered. The defendant contends that the plea agreement she signed
failed to specify the total amount of restitution that was owing, as well as her monthly obligation
to make payments towards the total restitution amount. Consequently, the defendant claims that
the plea agreement violated Rule 11(e)(6) which requires that the defendant be aware of the plea
negotiations and what agreement has been reached prior to entering a plea. Absent a final
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restitution amount in the plea agreement, the defendant argues that she was not in a position to
know whether her compliance with the plea agreement was possible. The defendant argued that
the lack of specificity is particularly important with respect to a plea in abeyance because the
defendant's compliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement would determine whether
the case is ultimately dismissed or whether a conviction is entered.
The disputed language of the plea agreement states:
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is
requested by the parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing
will cover the time period April 7,2002 to October 31,2003.
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the
amount of $
. Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least
$
.00 per month, beginning one month from the date of the restitution
hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid Fraud Control U n i t . . .
While the total restitution amount was not stipulated to along with the defendant's monthly
restitution payment amount, it is apparent that the parties understood and agreed to further
litigate this issue with the Court. The defendant signed the plea agreement stating that she knew
and understood that she owed restitution to the victim, including a minimum amount of $55,220.
The defendant also understood that there was a dispute as to the final amount owing and
agreed that a restitution hearing would be held to detennine the final restitution amount. In fact,
a restitution hearing was scheduled following the entry of defendant's plea. The agreement
further states that the state is limited to a specified time period in which to present additional
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evidence relating to restitution. The agreement does not necessarily work to either parties
advantage or disadvantage because neither party knew at the time of the entry of the plea what
the final restitution amount would be.
Rule 11(e)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that before accepting a
guilty plea, the Court must find that "if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion
and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached." The Court is satisfied based
on the language of the plea agreement that the defendant understood what it was she was
agreeing to. The Court finds that Rule 11(e)(6) does not require that restitution be determined to
the last detail before a defendant can enter into a plea agreement, whether it be a plea in abeyance
or a regular plea. The Court notes that restitution hearings are often required or requested
following entry of a plea and the law provides a means for the Court to address restitution issues
following a guilty plea. Pursuant to section 77~2a-3(5)(b)(2002), the court may upon acceptance
of a plea in abeyance agreement order that restitution be paid to victims "as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act." See, Utah Code Ann. §77-2a~3(5)(b) (2002). If a
dispute exists over restitution, the Court shall conduct a hearing to determine the amount of
restitution that is owing. See, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38(a)-302(4)(2003),and § 77-2a3(5)(b)(2004).
The Court also finds that the mere fact that this was a plea in abeyance agreement rather
than an ordinary plea agreement does not alter the Court's analysis. A plea in abeyance is
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different in one aspect from an ordinary plea agreement because a plea in abeyance agreement
allows the Court to withhold entering judgment for a specified period of time during which the
defendant must comply with certain terms and conditions. If the defendant complies with the
agreement, the plea may be ultimately withdrawn and the charges that were pled to can be
dismissed or reduced according to the agreement. However, aside from this difference, a plea in
abeyance is still a plea of guilty or "no contest" and requires that the Court comply with the same
rules and Constitutional protections as are found in an ordinary plea agreement. In the instant
case, the plea in abeyance agreement advises the defendant of the charges against her and advises
her of all of the rights she is entitled to under the Constitution and all the rights she would be
giving up by entering a plea of guilty. The agreement also contains a factual basis for
defendant's plea and explains what the State is agreeing to in exchange for defendant's guilty
plea, including the dismissal of other charges that were filed against the defendant.
In short, the Court treats a plea in abeyance agreement the same as an ordinary plea
agreement and must assure that the defendant is afforded all of the same protections and rights
and complies with the same rules as with any other plea. In the instant case, the Court entered
the defendant's plea only after being satisfied that the defendant was advised of her rights and
that her plea complied with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Following the entry of the plea, a restitution hearing was conducted and the Court
determined the full restitution amount and established the monthly payment schedule the
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defendant was to comply with. The Court notes that the defendant did not file an appeal to
challenge the Court's restitution order. Moreover, the defendant did not appeal a subsequent
order by the Court finding her in violation of her plea agreement for failure to comply with the
Court's Order on restitution. However, the issue before the Court is not the final restitution
amount, nor the fact that the restitution hearing went one way or the other, but whether the
defendant knowingly entered into the agreement with the restitution amount to be determined at
the restitution hearing. The Court finds that the defendant's entry of this plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered with respect to that issue.
The Court also finds that defendant's claim that she was coerced into entering by her
former counsel is without merit. The record reflects that during the plea colloquy the Court
specifically asked the defendant whether she was pleading guilty of her own free will and she
responded affirmatively. Furthermore, based on the pleadings of the party and the statements of
defense counsel during oral argument effectively withdrawing this as a claim before the Court, I
find that the defendant's plea was voluntarily made and was not the result of coercion or undue
influence from any source. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea is
/s«f£

denied.
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ORDERED this!6_ day of November, 2006.
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JUDGE ANN BOYDEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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